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the European Commission of (EC) Communication of 29 November 2017 on the EU 
approach to Standard Essential Patents. The report examines the principles identified in 
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FRAND ( Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory) terms; and (iii) enforcement.  
The report evaluates the efficient resolution of licensing disputes over FRAND, including 
via litigation, arbitration and mediation, licensing pools and collective licensing. The 
current document also puts forward some policy recommendations to, inter alia, enhance 
the general environment of FRAND licencing in the context of SEPs. 
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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Background 
This report provides legal analysis of the European Commission (EC) Communication of 29 November 
2017 (“the Communication”) which emphasises the need to balance standardisation of technology 
with the rights of patent-holders.  
 
The key advantage of standardisation is that it can secure efficiency gains, and benefit consumers, by 
allowing manufacturers to increase the overall size of markets and thus achieve economies of scale as 
well as increased product substitutability. Standardisation is particularly crucial in the information and 
communication technology (ICT) and Internet of Things fields (IoT) (consumer electronics, automative 
industry, and electricity grid industry). Furthermore, this is not merely a consumer issue – 
standardisation is also key to the use of ICT and IoT in the development of ‘smart cities’ capable of 
dealing with a range of issues, such as traffic regulation, resource management and public health, in a 
more efficient manner.  
 
Patents are a type of property. As with any kind of property, owners must be able to enforce their rights 
against competitors who are trespassing, or infringing, upon their patents. Without the ability to 
enforce, there would be no way to recoup the investment in resources required to create a new 
patentable invention in the first place. Patents cover new inventions, including important technology 
standards. Patents on standards are commonly known as Standard-Essential Patents (SEPs) and are 
frequently litigated. 
 
The existence of SEPs – and associated litigation - has potentially disruptive consequences for the 
manufacture, marketing and distribution of complex products that include many patented standards, 
eg ICT products such as smart-phones incorporating a camera, a video, a web browser, wireless, text 
messages, etc, as well as an increasing array of IoT ‘networked’ products such as wearable devices and 
appliances for ‘smart homes’. By enforcing their patents – their time-limited monopoly right - owners 
of SEPs could, if they wished, use the patent enforcement system to ‘hold up’ or prevent competitors 
from launching rival products that use the same standards. This raises serious concerns over 
competition in the marketplace and the need to maintain interoperability to ensure the IoT industry 
can develop. Therefore, acute tension exists between SEPs (which offer their owners R&D 
incentives/rewards in the form of monopolistic rights) and standards (which allow for widespread and 
collective use). This is particularly the case in the ICT and IoT fields, which have recently witnessed an 
increase in the number of granted patents.  
 
How can an appropriate balance be reached? How can the optimum scenario of incentivising the 
development of new inventive technologies, including standards, while also allowing fair competition 
be achieved? The answer is clear: fair licensing practices. In order to balance the need for 
standardisation, required for public use, with the private rights of SEP-holders, standard-setting 
organisations (SSOs) typically require SEP-owners to give an irrevocable undertaking that they are 
prepared to grant competitors licences on FRAND terms (fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory). 
 
Difficulties arise however, when a consensus cannot be reached between the parties as to what is 
FRAND in a particular scenario. If SEP-owners and prospective licensees disagree over eg the value of 
the royalties that should be considered fair and reasonable, or if one party considers that the licence 
terms are discriminatory, or if the parties disagree over the territorial scope of the licence, this could 
lead to inconvenient hold-up of technology diffusion and marketing of products and service. This could 
Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 6 
have significance beyond the individual dispute - McKinsey reported in 2015 that without 
interoperability the IoT industry could lose out on as much as 40% of its potential value. 
 
Due to the fact that a variety of different companies require access to SEP-protected technologies (eg, 
WiFi, technology standards such as 4G and 5G) a transparent SEP licensing regime is viewed as essential 
for the development of the IoT. In the past it was mainly ICT companies (particularly the manufacturers 
of phones, laptops, etc.) that engaged in SEP licensing. However, with the IoT a new range of companies 
are having to consider SEPs – the manufacturers of household appliances, automobiles, etc. This makes 
the achievement of a balanced SEP licensing system a vital aim of the European Union.  
 
The EU courts have emphasised this need for balance. In the seminal case Huawei v ZTE (Case C-170/13 
Huawei Technologies, EU:C:2015:477) the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) upheld the 
approach that seeking an injunction against a willing licensee of a SEP can be an abuse of a dominant 
position; but that SEP-owners, who commit to grant third parties a FRAND-license, do not abuse their 
dominant position in seeking an injunction or the recall of products provided that they comply with 
certain strict obligations.  
 
In the aftermath of the Huawei v ZTE case, the European Commission (EC) Communication of 29 
November 2017 considered three important aspects of SEPs: (i) the need to have a more transparent 
environment for negotiations between SEP-owners and licensees; (ii) the requirement to have common 
principles governing the valuation of SEPs technologies and FRAND terms; and (iii) proposals for a more 
balanced enforcement system. 
 
Aim and findings of the study 
This study aims, inter alia, at verifying the effectiveness of the approach proposed in the 
Communication. It is aimed at assessing whether the approach adopted by the CJEU in Huawei v ZTE 
(an approach that has been endorsed in the Communication and by national judges) satisfies in an 
effective manner the interests of all stakeholders, ie SEP-owners, standard implementers, especially 
SMEs, and consumers. This report concludes that these are indeed sensible approaches.  
(I) Transparency 
The Communication is correct that transparency is crucial. Moreover, encouraging greater cooperation 
between the SSOs and the Patent offices is a laudable aim. The next requirement is a detailed plan for 
achieving this, including deepening the links between the EU institutions, the EPO and SSOs. We note 
that the recently announced EU Commission Expert Group on SEPs could play a role in this regard. This 
is in line with the need for all stakeholders, especially SSOs and the owners of SEPs, to raise greater 
awareness of FRAND licensing processes and their implications, especially for SMEs. In particular, the 
links between EU institutions, the EPO, the national patent offices in all EU Member States and SSO 
could be strengthened by the use of publicly accessible databases that can make available precious 
information on: (i) the current owner of a patent and (ii) the status of the patent (thus potentially 
clarifying the overall breadth of the SEP, and thus the implementer’s potential exposure). In this regard, 
formal, written agreements between SSOs and patent offices in Europe, facilitated by the institutions 
of the EU such as the Commission and European Parliament, should be secured to guarantee that the 
links to such important information are smoothly and efficiently managed.  
(II) Valuation of SEP technologies and FRAND terms 
The principles identified in the Communication with a view to guiding the valuation of SEPs and FRAND 
terms are sound and viable in general terms. Nonetheless, the principles lack detail with regard to the 
Standard Essential Patents and the Internet of Things 
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precise terms of FRAND licensing and the exact meaning of good faith. Some academic commentators 
and practitioners have criticised the Communication for a lack of clarity in the guidance regarding the 
determination of the balance between patent rights and the principles of fair competition. However, 
as the Commission concluded in the Communication, there is no ‘one-size fits all’ solution, particularly 
in light of the diversity of licensing practices across different sectors and geographical areas. As such, 
the Communication strikes the appropriate balance by providing as much guidance as possible while 
leaving it to national courts to decide what is FRAND in each case. 
Additionally, in line with the Communication, schemes should be explored with a view to striking a 
more harmonious balance between the interests of all stakeholders, including: 
 
- encouraging SEPs holders to disclose - before the adoption of the standard - the most 
restrictive licensing terms, such as the maximum royalty rate; 
- requiring undisclosed SEPs to be licensed on a royalty-free basis;  
- encouraging SSOs to organise and manage auctions with a view to choosing the most 
convenient technology; 
- inserting most-favoured licensee clauses in licensing agreements;  
- adopting collective licensing and/or patent pools schemes; 
- using open source platforms to enhance transparency and the provision of information 
 
(III) Proposals for a more balanced enforcement system 
 
The policy recommendations in the Communication on enforcement are generally appropriate. The 
reliance of the EC Communication on the CJEU’s decision in Huawei v ZTE is opportune. Indeed, the 
CJEU guidelines aim to satisfy the interests of all stakeholders, ie SEP-owners, standard implementers, 
particularly SMEs, and consumers. The Communication’s recommendation of a balanced, ‘case-by-
case’ approach, with an important role for national courts, appears well-reasoned. 
 
While the above recommendations are appropriate, alternatives to litigation can often be more swift 
and more cost-effective ways of resolving disputes between SEP-holders and implementers, especially 
SMEs. Mediation and arbitration offer considerable cost benefits when compared with litigation, 
including (i) quicker and less expensive proceedings, (ii) a more informal and flexible dispute 
environment, (iii) confidentiality, (iv) more control over the proceedings, (v) enhanced and improved 
communication between the parties. Arbitration proceedings may be particularly important to 
determine SEP related cases. Indeed, as a general remark, arbitration worldwide is growing in 
importance as a means of resolving IP licensing disputes. Alternative dispute resolutions may also be 
embraced by the Unified Patent Court, if and when it becomes operational. The UPC will feature highly 
specialised judges and likely offer a dedicated arbitration and mediation centre. It would therefore be 
recommendable to provide UPC arbitrators and mediators with (even more enhanced) training in the 
specific field of standard essential patents. 
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GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
• The conclusions reached by the EC Communication of 29 November 2017 are to a great 
extent reasonable and appropriate. 
• The CJEU guidelines in Huawei v ZTE (an approach that has been endorsed in the 
Communication) attempt to satisfy the interests of all stakeholders, ie SEP-owners, standard 
implementers, especially SMEs, and consumers. The Communication’s recommendation of a 
balanced, ‘case-by-case’ approach, with an important role for national courts, appears well-
reasoned. 
• The principles identified in the Communication with a view to encouraging transparency, 
guiding the valuation of SEPs and FRAND terms, and managing enforcement are sound and viable, 
including the promotion of alternative dispute resolutions, which may offer cheaper and quicker 
ways to manage SEPs disputes, especially before the Unified Patent Court (if and when it is fully 
operational). 
• In line with the Communication, schemes could be explored with a view to striking a more 
harmonious balance between the interests of all stakeholders, including:  
• (i) encouraging SEP-owners to disclose - before the adoption of the standard - the most 
restrictive licensing terms, such as the maximum royalty rate;  
• (ii) requiring undisclosed SEPs to be licensed on a royalty-free basis;  
• (iii) encouraging SSOs to organise and manage auctions with a view to choosing the most 
convenient technology;  
• (iv) inserting most-favoured licensee clauses in licensing agreements;  
• (v) adopting collective licensing and/or patent pools schemes;  
• (vi) using open source platforms to enhance transparency and the provision of information. 
 
 
 
 
Standard Essential Patents and the Internet of Things 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 9 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Standardisation is key to innovative developments in a range of industrial sectors. It can secure 
efficiency gains and benefit consumers by allowing manufacturers to increase the overall size of 
markets, and thus achieve economies of scale as well as the increasing of product substitutability. 
Standardisation is particularly important in the rapidly developing information and communication 
technology (ICT) and ‘Internet of Things’ fields (IoT) (consumer electronics, automative industry, and 
electricity grid industry). Since the ICT and IoT fields are some of the most important business sectors 
in Europe, and are projected to grow rapidly in upcoming years, ensuring that standardisation works 
to the benefit of companies that operate in the European Union is a priority for the EU’s institutions. 
 
Importantly, standardisation goes beyond the expected consumer issues – it is also key to recent 
discussions about the use of ICT and IoT to create ‘smart cities’ capable of dealing with issues such as 
traffic regulation, resource management, and public health in a more efficient manner (Manyika, Chui, 
Bisson, Woetzel, Dobbs, Bughin & Aharon, 2015). Harmonious interaction between the private and 
public sectors is crucial in this regard, underlining the importance of standardisation for EU member 
states. 
 
Patents are a type of property, granting a monopoly over new inventions, eg a protected technology, 
that lasts for a 20 year period. In Europe, patents are typically granted at the European Patent Office 
(EPO) or at the national patent offices. As with any kind of property, owners must be able to enforce 
their rights against competitors who are trespassing, or infringing, upon their patents. Without the 
ability to enforce, there would be no way to recoup the investment in resources required to create a 
new patentable invention in the first place – including patents on important new technology standards 
relevant to ICT and IoT. 
 
Patents on standards are commonly known as Standard-Essential Patents (SEPs). SEPs are frequently 
litigated as a result of their centrality to the ICT and IoT fields, which contributes to their overall value 
(Contreras, Gaessler, Helmers & Love, 2018). Crucially, the existence of SEPs – and associated litigation 
between patent holders and implementers of technology standards - has potentially disruptive 
consequences for the manufacture, marketing and distribution of complex products. This is particularly 
apparent with respect to ICT products such as smart-phones incorporating a camera, a video, a web 
browser, wireless, text messages, etc, as well as the increasing array of IoT ‘networked’ products such 
as wearable devices and appliances for ‘smart homes’ (Tsilikas & Tapia, 2017).  Indeed, while in the past 
it was mainly ICT companies (particularly the manufacturers of phones, laptops, etc.) that had to 
engage in SEP licensing, with the rise of the IoT sector a new range of companies are having to consider 
SEPs – eg, the manufacturers of household appliances, automobiles, etc. 
 
There is no doubt that acute tension exists between SEPs (which offer their owners R&D 
incentives/rewards in the form of monopolistic rights) and standards (which allow for widespread and 
collective use). This is related to the classic debate between the need to protect the patent monopoly 
and the principles of  fair competition. Owners of SEPs could, if they wished, use the patent 
enforcement system to ‘hold up’ or prevent competitors from launching rival products that use the 
same standards (Lemley & Shapiro, 2008; Bonadio, 2013). There is also a risk that the exercise of 
monopoly power by SEP-owners could lead to the need for implementers to obtain multiple licences 
– this is known as the problem of ‘royalty-stacking’ (Lemley, 2007; Armstrong, Mueller & Syrett, 2014; 
Jones, 2014). The potential role of Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) in creating nuisance litigation over 
SEPs in the ICT/IoT fields is a related concern (Helmers, Love & McDonagh, 2014; Contreras, Gaessler, 
Helmers & Love, 2018). These concerns are further highlighted by the fact that is the ICT and IoT fields 
Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
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have recently witnessed an increase in the number of granted patents, which indicates that rates of 
litigation in this area is likely to continue to rise.  
 
At the same time, there are differing views among legal analysts and economists about how profound 
the risks of ‘hold up’ and ‘royalty-stacking’ are in the context of SEPs, with some scholars arguing that 
the risks of overall economic harm can sometimes be over-stated (Spulber, 2018; Galetovic, Haber & 
Zaretzki, 2018). Nonetheless, as explored below in 2.1, recent cases at the CJEU and national levels 
demonstrate that SEPs are a genuine cause for concern with respect to ensuring fair competition in the 
marketplace and maintaining interoperability to facilitate the development of the IoT industry (Lemley, 
2007; Bonadio, 2013; Contreras, Gaessler, Helmers & Love, 2018). 
 
Indeed, in order to balance the need for standardisation with the private rights of SEP-owners, 
standard-setting organisations (SSOs) typically require SEP-owners to give an irrevocable undertaking 
that they are prepared to grant competitors licences on FRAND terms (fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory). 
 
Difficulties arise however, when a consensus cannot be reached between the parties as to what is 
FRAND in a particular scenario. If SEP-owners and prospective licensees disagree over the value of the 
royalties that should be considered fair and reasonable, or if one party considers that the licence terms 
are discriminatory, or if if the parties disagree over the territorial scope of the licence, this could lead to 
inconvenient hold-up of technology diffusion and marketing of products and service (Ünver, 2018).  
Moreover, this could have significance beyond the individual dispute: McKinsey reported in 2015 that 
without interoperability the IoT industry may lose out on as much as 40% of its potential value 
(Manyika, Chui, Bisson, Woetzel, Dobbs, Bughin & Aharon, 2015). 
 
Due to the fact that a variety of different companies require access to SEP-protected technologies (eg, 
WiFi, technology standards such as 4G and 5G) a transparent SEP licensing regime is essential for the 
development of the IoT sector. This makes the achievement of a balanced SEP licensing system a vital 
aim and pressing need of the European Union. The EU courts have already considered this need for 
balance - in the seminal case of Huawei v ZTE the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) upheld 
the approach that seeking an injunction against a willing licensee of a SEP can be an abuse of a 
dominant position; and that SEP-owners, who commit to grant third parties a FRAND-license, do not 
abuse their dominant position in seeking an injunction or the recall of products, only provided that 
they comply with certain strict obligations (Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies, EU:C:2015:477).  
In the aftermath of the case of Huawei v ZTE, the European Commission (EC) Communication of 29 
November 2017 (“the Communication”) considered three important aspects of SEPs (Swanson & 
Baumol, 2005; Farrell, Hayes, Shapiro & Sullivan, 2007):  
(i) the need to have a more transparent environment for negotiations between SEP-owners 
and licensees;  
(ii) the need of common principles governing SEPs technologies; and  
(iii) proposals for a more balanced enforcement system. This study seeks to verify the 
effectiveness of the approach proposed in the EC Communication. 
In s.2.1 this report aims to: 
 
• assess whether the approach adopted by the CJEU in case C-170/13 Huawei v ZTE (an approach 
that has been endorsed in the Communication and by national judges) satisfies in an effective manner 
the interests of all stakeholders, ie SEP-owners, standard implementers, especially SMEs, and 
consumers;1  
                                                 
1 Unwired Planet v Huaweï [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) (holding, amongst other issues, that the non-discrimination element of FRAND indicates that 
SEPs holders cannot discriminate between implementers that are “similarly situated”). 
Standard Essential Patents and the Internet of Things 
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Summary assessment: This is indeed a sensible approach. The complexities involved in SEP litigation 
and FRAND licensing make it difficult to prescribe a strict ‘one-size fits all’ approach. The national courts, 
making reference to the CJEU where necessary, are in the best position to decide on a case-by-case 
basis whether the FRAND negotiations have been conducted on a reasonable basis, in good faith, and 
whether an injunction is warranted in the case of infringement. Yet the absence of the Unified Patent 
Court (UPC) for the EU – which has been delayed by Brexit, German and Hungarian court challenges 
(and also features the non-participation of Spain, Poland and Croatia) - leaves the possibility that 
fragmentation of SEP legal outcomes can occur within Europe. Nonetheless,, national courts have, thus 
far, taken a sensible approach. The 2017 English High Court decision in Unwired Planet International Ltd 
v Huawei [2017] EWHC 711, uses guidance from the CJEU decision in Huawei v ZTE, and emphasises  the 
significance of global licensing. This acknowledgement is a positive development, as standardisation 
of IoT (for example, 5G) is a global issue. Overall, therefore, this report finds that the Commission is right 
on this point - the legal complexity involved in FRAND negotiations and SEP litigation means that there 
is little than can be done from the EU level. SEP cases are self-evidently ‘hard cases’ that are best 
resolved at the national level  
 
In s.2.2 this report aims to:  
• examine the proposal (mentioned in the Communication) to increase transparency on SEP 
exposure, which seems to be particularly crucial in the context of IoT where new players with little 
experience of SEP licensing often enter the market for connectivity 
 
Summary assessment: The EC is correct in the Communication that transparency is crucial. Moreover, 
encouraging greater cooperation between the SSOs and the Patent offices is a laudable aim. The next 
requirement is a detailed plan for achieving this, including deepening the links between the EU 
institutions, the EPO, national patent offices, and SSOs. This report notes that the recently announced 
EU Commission Expert Group on SEPs (‘Group of experts on licensing and valuation of standard 
essential patents (E03600)’) could play a role in this regard. This is in line with the need for all 
stakeholders, especially SSOs and SEP-owners, to increase awareness of FRAND licensing processes and 
their implications, especially for SMEs (as also mentioned in the Communication).  
 
In s.2.2 this report further aims to: 
• verify whether the principles identified in the Communication with a view to guiding the 
valuation of SEPs and FRAND terms, are sound and viable; 
 
 Summary assessment: The principles are sound and viable in general terms. Nonetheless, the 
principles could be said to be lacking in detail with regard to the precise terms of FRAND licensing and 
the exact meaning of good faith negotiations - as we explore over the course of this report, some 
academic commentators and practitioners have criticised the Communication for a lack of clarity in the 
guidance regarding the determination of the balance between patent rights and the principles of fair 
competition. However, as the Commission concluded, there is no ‘one-size fits all’ solution, particularly 
in light of the diversity of licensing practices across different sectors and geographical areas. As such, 
the Communication strikes the appropriate balance by providing as much guidance as possible while 
leaving it to national courts to decide what is FRAND in each case. 
Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
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As noted below in 2.2, a number of policy statements may be considered by EU institutions with regard 
to enforcement: 
• are the principles relating to enforcement sound? This includes the preference  to avoid, as far 
as possible, disputes related to FRAND commitments, eg by encouraging SEP-owners to disclose - 
before the adoption of the standard - the most restrictive licensing terms, such as the maximum royalty 
rate (royalty-capping approach); eg by requiring undisclosed SEPs to be licensed on a royalty-free basis; 
both proposals aim at minimising the impact on final consumers, on whom costs deriving from high 
royalty are usually passed.  
 
• an alternative proposal would be to give SSOs the task to manage auctions between different 
technologies - patent owners that want their technology to be included as or in the standard could 
submit offers to SSOs to license their patent specifying a royalty. The implementer would then proceed 
to choose the most convenient offer (Swanson & Baumol, 2005; Farrell, Hayes, Shapiro & Sullivan, 2007). 
Such a system may offer a benchmark for calculating the FRAND royalty rate.  
 
• there is a need to eliminate any discrimination amongst implementers, eg by relying on most-
favoured licensee clauses (MFL) in licensing agreements, taking into account competition-related 
concerns. This clause requires SEP-owners to promptly notify a licensee of any licence, granted by them 
to a third party for the same patent under analogous circumstances (Brooks & Geradin, 2011; Van Bael 
& Bells, 2005). Such a clause aims thus at promising that no other licensee will obtain better terms and 
conditions (Lichtman, 2006). 
 
• this report concurs with the Communication that alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
(including mediation and arbitration) should be promoted as swift and cost-effective ways to resolve 
disputes between SEP-owners and implementers, especially SMEs (Betancourt, 2016). Alternative 
dispute resolutions may also be embraced by the Unified Patent Court, when it will be fully operational, 
as also noted by the Communication.2 Indeed, the UPC will feature highly specialised judges and likely 
offer a dedicated arbitration and mediation centre. It would therefore be recommendable to provide 
UPC arbitrators and mediators with (even more enhanced) training in the specific field of standard 
essential patents (McDonagh, 2016; McDonagh and Mimler, 2017). 
 
As detailed in 2.3 the European Union institutions could explore the following options: 
 
• enhancing the viability of collective licensing schemes, which would entail that participants to 
a SSO should be allowed to collectively negotiate royalty rates on behalf of standard implementers, so 
as to counterbalance the strong bargaining power held by SEP-owners.  
  
• exploring the viability of licensing pools and other licensing platforms, including platforms that 
make use of advanced machine-learning (artificial intelligence), which may be particularly suitable for 
IoT industries, especially SMEs.  
 
• investigating  the viability of ‘open source’ approaches in standardisation processes, noting 
that ought to be pursued where possible; but also acknowledging that open-source success stories, 
                                                 
2 See p. 12 of the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents, Brussels, 29.11.2017 COM(2017) 712.  
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/26583 
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such as software, have succeeded via copyright law, rather than patent law, and in the absence of a 
generally accepted system of open patenting, it may be insufficient as a solution.3 
  
                                                 
3 See p. 12 of the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents, Brussels, 29.11.2017 COM(2017) 712. 
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/26583 
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2. ANALYSING THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION COMMUNICATION OF 29 
NOVEMBER 2017 
 
The Communication highlights three relevant areas in the field of SEPs where further action is required 
to optimise the relationship between SEPs and SSOs. The Communication puts forward:  
(i) proposals to create a more transparent environment for negotiations to take place between 
SEP owners and potential licensees;  
(ii) common valuation principles for SEP technologies; and  
(iii) recommendations for a balanced and predictable enforcement regime. 
 
The key principles affirmed in the Communication are aimed at developing and maintaining a 
balanced, smooth and predictable environment for SEPs, which would particularly benefit the IoT field. 
Ultimately, by outlining these principles, the Communication attempts to fulfil two key goals: (a) to 
encourage the creation and incorporation of the best technologies in standards by ensuring 
developers get a fair return on their investments; and (b) to guarantee the highest levels of 
dissemination and access to standardised technologies as possible.  
 
At first glance, these may seem to be easily reconcilable objectives - patent protection in the context 
of SEPs, while helping to guarantee a return on investment in R&D, nonetheless has the potential to 
restrict access to, and dissemination, of, standardised technologies. Taking a ‘middle way’ approach 
the Commission identifies solutions based on smooth licensing practices, transparent procedures and 
‘controlled’ enforcement actions that represent positive steps towards achieving that balance.  
 
As such, the Communication represents a laudable attempt by the Commission to put forward 
solutions for the current challenges of SEPs in the context of the IoT, taking into account the 
perspectives of key stakeholders - not only patent owners, but also European start-ups and EU citizens 
that often need access to products and services based on the best performing standardised 
technology.  
 
Before examining the Communication’s guiding principles in detail, it is necessary to outline the key 
CJEU and national case law that prompted the Commission’s publication of the Communication.   
 
2.1. Outlining the key case law at the EU level and in national jurisdictions 
 
Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) the EU has exclusive competence 
over competition and the internal market. For this reason IP and FRAND licensing comes within the 
remit of the European Commission.4 The Commission has used its investigative powers on a number 
of occasions, and has put forward the Horizontal Guidelines  on  the  applicability  of  Article  101  TFEU  
to  horizontal  cooperation agreements  (2010 version). As noted below, the EU Commission has made 
three significant interventions in the arena of SEPs and competition. In addition, the CJEU decision in 
Huawei v ZTE (Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies, EU:C:2015:477) 
                                                 
4 See also Directive 2004/48/EC of 29.4.2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, pub. OJ L 195 of 2.6.2004, recital 3     
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provided the key EU judicial statement on SEPs, FRAND and competition. These cases were examined 
in detail in a 2017 EC report (Pentheroudakis and Baron, 2017), so rather than duplicate this analysis, 
we highlight the key points below.  
2.1.1. The European Commission and the CJEU  
 
European Commission, Decision of 9.12.2009 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the  
Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, Case COMP/38.636, Rambus. 
 
The 2007 Rambus case concerned Art 102 TFEU (Art 82 EC). The Commission stated that Rambus was 
abusing its dominant position in the DRAMS market by engaging in ‘patent ambush’ tactics, whereby 
it would initially conceal that it had patents relevant to the JEDEC standard, but then subsequently 
claim royalties for use of those patents. In response to the Commission’s concerns, Rambus agreed to 
put a five-year worldwide cap on its royalty rates for products that complied with JEDEC standards and 
reduced other royalty rates. 
 
European Commission, DG Competition, Commitment Decision of 29 April 2014, C(2014) 2891 final, 
Samsung  Electronics Co., Ltd., et. al.  
 
Samsung committed to licensing its SEPs on mobile telecommunication standards on FRAND terms. 
During 2011 Samsung sought an injunction against Apple regarding its ETSI 3G UMTS standard. The 
Commission stated that Apple was acting as a willing licensee and that Samsung’s behaviour 
potentially constituted abuse of a dominant position under Art 102 TFEU. In response Samsung made 
an offer in line with Art 9 Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 to not seek injunctive relief from any court/tribunal 
in the EEA for infringement of its ‘Mobile SEPs’ against any potential licensee that complies with the 
‘Licensing Framework’ for determining FRAND terms (the licensing framework envisaged either a 
licensing agreement or a cross-licensing agreement). This was accepted by the Commission. The 
Opinion considered what might amount to ‘unwilling’ behaviour from a potential licensor and 
provided guidance regarding settling FRAND disputes in line with EU competition rules.  
 
European  Commission,  DG  Competition,  Decision  of  29  April  2014,  C(2014)  2892 final,  Motorola Mobility  
Inc.  
 
Here the Commission found that Motorola had engaged in abusive conduct in Germany by seeking to 
enforce an injunction against Apple on the basis of an SEP for which it had committed to FRAND 
licensing where Apple had agreed to take a licence framed around FRAND royalties determined by the 
German court. The Commission stated that ‘the acceptance of binding third party determination for 
the terms of a FRAND license in the event that  bilateral  negotiations do not come to a  fruitful 
conclusion  is  a  clear  indication  that  a  potential  licensee  is  willing  to  enter  into  a FRAND  license’.  
Moreover, Motorola’s insistence that Apple give up its right to challenge the validity of the Motorola 
SEPs was an anti-competitive action. Yet, the Commission accepted that injunctions must be an an 
available remedy in a case where a licensee is unwilling to take a licence on FRAND terms. Whether a 
company is a ‘willing licensee’ should be determined on a case-by-case basis.  The  Commission noted 
that national  courts  and  arbitrators  are generally in a better position to determine FRAND terms. 
Notably, the Commission indicated that a Germany-only licence could be FRAND (an issue of relevance 
to subsequent case law examined below). 
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Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies, EU:C:2015:477. 
 
The Düsseldorf District Court requested a preliminary ruling from the CJEU regarding the availability of 
remedies, particularly injunctions, to SEP-owners who had made FRAND commitments, upon 
succeeding in patent infringement actions. In a landmark ruling, the CJEU held that Article 102 TFEU 
must be interpreted as meaning that the proprietor of a patent essential to a standard established by 
a standardisation body, which has given an irrevocable undertaking to that body to grant a licence to 
third parties on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (‘FRAND’) terms, does not abuse its dominant 
position, within the meaning of that article, by bringing an action for infringement seeking an 
injunction prohibiting the infringement of its patent or seeking the recall of products for the 
manufacture of which that patent has been used (Bharadwaj & Verma, 2018), as long as: 
(1) prior to bringing that action, the proprietor has, first, alerted the alleged infringer of the 
violation complained about by designating that patent and specifying the way in which it has been 
encroached upon, and, secondly, after the alleged infringer has expressed its willingness to conclude 
a licensing agreement on FRAND terms, presented to that infringer a specific, written offer for a licence 
on such terms, specifying, in particular, the royalty and the way in which it is to be calculated, and 
(2) where the alleged infringer continues to use the patent in question, the latter has not diligently 
responded to that offer, in accordance with recognised commercial practices in the field and in good 
faith, this being a matter which must be established on the basis of objective factors and which implies, 
in particular, that there are no delaying tactics. 
 
A key point is found in paragraph 53 of the ruling: an 'undertaking  to  grant  licences  on  FRAND  terms  
creates legitimate  expectations  on  the  part  of  third  parties  that  the  proprietor  of  the  SEP  will  in  
fact grant  licences on such terms' (Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies, EU:C:2015:477, paragraph 53). 
2.1.2. National Jurisdictions 
 
To allow competition, SEP-owners are obliged to licence on FRAND terms. This obligation is 
underpinned by EU competition law (as explained in Huawei v ZTE). In terms of national case law in 
European jurisdictions, as with the EC and CJEU rulings, a thorough assessment of SEPs national case 
law has recently been published by the EC (Pentheroudakis & Baron, 2017). For this reason this report 
does not attempt to duplicate this in-depth analysis, but rather it summarises the most important case 
outcomes in the most noteworthy cases in the key jurisdictions of Germany, The Netherlands, France 
and the UK, and indicate the influence of the CJEU decision in Huawei v ZTE. This report further takes 
account of judgments that occurred subsequent to the 2017 EC report. As we shall see, several 
European court rulings have allowed injunctions in the context of SEPs/FRAND - e.g. St.  Lawrence v  
Deutsche Telekom  and HTC  (Germany, District court, 2015),  NTT  DoCoMo v HTC  (Germany, District 
court, 2016),  St. Lawrence  v  Vodafone  and HTC  (Germany, District court, 2016),  Unwired Planet v Huawei  
(UK, English High Court,  2017), etc. This analysis of national case law sets the scene for our 
consideration of the Communication’s recommendations in s2.2.  
Germany  
 
Mannheim District Court, 17 December 2013, 2 O 41/13  – Vringo  v  ZTE;  Karlsruhe  Court of Appeal,  19  
February  2014,  6  U 162/13  –  ZTE  v  Vringo: here the district court made an infringement finding 
regarding an SEP (cellular standard), with the appeal court rejecting a stay of proceedings pending the 
CJEU Huawei decision. 
 
Mannheim District  Court,  10  March  2015, 2  O  103/14   -  St  Lawrence Communication  v  Deutsche  
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Telekom;  Karlsruhe  Court  of  Appeal,  23 April  2015, 6  U  44/15  -  St  Lawrence  Communication  v  
Deutsche  Telekom;  Mannheim District Court,  27  November  2015,  2  O  106/14,  2  O  107/14,  2  O  
108/14,  St  Lawrence Communication  v  Deutsche  Telekom: here an injunction was granted against 
Deutsche Telekom due to infringement of an SEP (wideband speech-encoding standard) owned by St. 
Lawrence. It was held that the FRAND defence was unavailable to Deutsche Telekom as they were 
unwilling to conclude a global licence agreement. On appeal, the enforcement of the injunction was 
suspended; however, post-Huawei v ZTE (CJEU ruling) the Mannheim district court granted the 
injunction, following the CJEU guidance. Key to the case was the fact that the German court considered 
that a global licence would be FRAND. 
 
 Düsseldorf District Court, 3 November 2015, 4a O 144/14 und  4a  O 93/14 - Sisvel v Haier; Düsseldorf  
Court of Appeal, 13 January 2016, 15 U 65/15 and 15 U 66/15 – Sisvel v Haier: here, in related  cases,  the  
Düsseldorf district court granted an injunction to Sisvel against Haier concerning a group of SEPs 
related to smartphones/tablets (GSM, GPRS, UMTS, LTE standards). The parties had failed to reach an 
agreement on a FRAND licence, with the defendants claiming that the licence fees were unreasonable 
and excessive, and that they had only been given a worldwide licence offer, rather than a Germany-
specific one (yet the defendants failed to provide a counter-proposal).  
 
Mannheim District Court, 8 January 2016, 7 O 96/14 - Pioneer v Acer; Karlsruhe Court of Appeal, 31 May 
2016, 6 U 55/16: here the patent holder claimed that only a global licence would be FRAND – the court 
granted an injunction, holding that the defendant could not raise the FRAND defence in the light of 
the negotiations. On appeal, the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal upheld the injunction.  
 
Düsseldorf District Court, 19 January 2016, 4b O 120/14, 4b O 122/14 and 4b O 123/14 – Unwired  Planet  
v  Samsung: here the  German  district  court  held  that  Samsung and Huawei’s LTE and GSM-compliant  
handsets infringed Unwired Planet’s SEPs (cellular technology).  
 
Mannheim District Court, 29 January 2016, 7 O 66/15 - NTT DoCoMo v HTC NTT DoCoMO: here NTT 
asserted its SEPs (UMTS standard) against HTC Germany. NTT had offered HTC a 3-year regional licence 
with a specified royalty, but this was rejected by HTC, who made a counter-offer after legal action had 
begun. The counter-offer was rejected by NTT. The Mannheim Court found that NTT DoCoMo did not 
abuse its dominant position and granted the injunction.  
 
Düsseldorf District Court, 31 March 2016, 4a O 73/14 - St. Lawrence Communication v Vodafone;  
Düsseldorf  Court  of  Appeal, 9 May 2016,  I-15 U35/16, 15 U35/16 – St  Lawrence  Communication  v  
Vodafone: here the  dispute  concerned an SEP (AMR-WB standard on broadband speech transmission), 
with the district court granting a preliminary injunction against Vodafone for patent infringement, 
noting that Vodafone had neither made a  counter offer, nor furnished security. This was upheld on 
appeal at the Düsseldorf Court of appeal.  
 
Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, 29 September 2017, I-15 U 41/17 – Mobiles 
Kommunicationssystem: here the court referred to to the CJEU’s finding in Huawei and confirmed that 
FRAND negotiations should be concluded without success before the SEP owner can successfully 
object to an abuse of dominant position claim.  
 
Mannheim District Court, October 2018, 7 0 165/16 - IP Bridge v HTC - the court decided not to award an 
injunction to IP Bridge, holding that whomever acquires an SEP also assumes the FRAND obligations 
and must follow the CJEU rules for SEP disputes. 
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From the above, this report observes that the German cases are broadly in line with the reasoning of 
the CJEU in Huawei v ZTE, showing a clear willingness to grant injunctive relief to SEP-owners even in 
the FRAND context, if it is considered a fair outcome in the circumstances (licensing negotiation). The 
cases of St Lawrence and Pioneer show a preference for global licences as FRAND. In making this 
assessment, infringement courts will review the claimant’s FRAND licence offer, including evidence 
such as licence contracts. Depending on the evidence provided, the court will consider whether a 
defendant can rely on a FRAND-defence. 
 
The Netherlands 
 
The Hague District Court, 7 March 2010, Doc. no. 316533/HA ZA 082522 and 316535/HA ZA 08-2524  
(joint  cases) - Philips v SK Kasetten: here the Hague district court held that SK Kasetten had infringed 
several of Philips’SEPs (CD/DVD technology) and that Philips could enforce its SEPs even in the context 
of the FRAND commitments made by Philips.   
 
The Hague District Court, 10 March 2011, Case n° 389067 / KG  ZA  11-269  -  Sony Supply  Chain  Solutions  
(Europe)  B.V.  and  LG  Electronics,  Inc:  SEPs (Blu-ray) held by LG were allegedly infringed by Sony. FRAND 
negotiations had broken down. Having reviewed the circumstances, the Hague District Court lifted the 
interim injunction granted by the Breda District Court. 
 
The Hague District Court, 14 March 2012 and 20 June 2012, Cases No. 400367/HA ZA  11-2212  -  
Samsung  Electronics  v  Apple  Inc. et al: Samsung claimed that Apple had infringed upon its SEPs (3G). 
The court refused an interlocutory injunction due to the circumstances of the FRAND negotiations, 
holding that it could not be said that Apple was not negotiating in good faith.  
 
The Hague District Court, 24 October 2014, C/09/470109 / KG  ZA 14870 - ZTE v Vringo: in this case ZTE 
and Vringo were engaged in several back-and-forth disputes over SEPs owned by Vringo (UMTS). 
Vringo made a final licensing offer to ZTE but ZTE did not respond, and instead launched preliminary 
action at The Hague district court, claiming that Vringo was attempting to force it to accept the licence 
terms. This argument was rejected by the court. 
 
The Hague District Court, 10 February 2017, 2017:1025 – Archos S.A. v Koninklijke N.V.: the judge here 
did not accept the claim by smartphone manufacturer Archos arguing that Philips had abused its 
dominant position during FRAND negotiations. It was held in particular that Philips had not failed to 
engage in effective negotiations and that it was instead Archos that prevented a final agreement from 
being stricken. The court also took into account that (i) Archos had informed Philips that the latter 
would need to sue the former if it expected higher royalties, thus showing unwillingness to start serious 
negotiations; and (ii) the fact that Archos made low profits did not necessarily entail that the Philip’s 
offer was not FRAND-compliant. 
 
From the above it is clear that in The Netherlands the courts weigh up the circumstances of the FRAND 
negotiations over SEPs when determining whether to grant relief to an SEP holder. This is in accordance 
with the CJEU’s guidance in Huawei v ZTE. 
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France  
 
Paris District Court, 8 December 2011, no. RG 11/58301, Samsung Electronics Co Ltd, et al. v Apple  France 
Sar: here, Apple argued that Samsung‘s claim for an injunction would constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position. The court dismissed Samsung’s claim on other grounds and did not address the 
issue of dominance as it was unnecessary.  
 
Paris District Court, 29 November 2013, no 12/14922, Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v TCT Mobile  
Europe SAS and TCT Mobile International Ltd: here the case concerned Ericsson’s SEPs (3G standards - 
UMTS).  Ericsson sought a preliminary injunction against TCT Mobile. The district court held that a 
preliminary injunction could be granted for SEPs in circumstances when the negotiations for a license 
were ongoing (here the parties were in agreement regarding the geographical extent and 
technological scope of the licence, but had failed to agree a royalty rate).  
 
Paris District Court, 17 April 2015, n° 14/14124, Core Wireless v LG Electronics: here the case concerned 
Core  Wireless’ portfolio of SEPs (2G, 3G, 4G ETSI standards). Core Wireless did not see an injunction - 
rather, Core Wireless requested that the court set a FRAND rate for licensing its SEPs to LG. However, 
the court stated that Core Wireless had not proved that the standards were essential, and thus rejected 
its claims. 
 
Commercial Court of Marseille, 20 September 2016, RG 2016F01637, Wiko v Sisvel: this is the first 
reported case in France after the CJEU decision in Huawei. It was not about patent infringement, 
focusing instead of alleged acts of unfair competition as a consequence of letters being sent by a SEP 
enforcing non-exclusive licensee to customers of a smartphone retailers. It was held that sending such 
letters, warning retailers against possible patent infringement, may constitute a FRAND offer and does 
not amount to unfair competition. 
 
As with Germany and the Netherlands, the courts in France appear willing to grant injunctions, though 
the comparative lack of case law does not give clear guidance. Nonetheless, the decisions do not go 
against the criteria of the CJEU in Huawei v ZTE, and are broadly in line with the principles of that case. 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Nokia v Interdigital Technology, Chancery Division of the High Court of England and Wales,  Patents  
Court, 21 December 2007, [2007] EWHC 3077 (Pat): here the English High Court granted a negative 
declaration regarding the essentiality of patents to an international standard (except one patent, which 
was accepted as essential, but only for method claims).  
 
IPCom v Nokia, 18 May 2012, [2012] EWHC 1446 (Ch): here, the English High Court refused to grant 
IPCom an injunction against Nokia for an SEP for which it had made FRAND commitments.  Key here 
was that Nokia was willing to take a licence on FRAND TERMS.   
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Vringo Infrastructure Inc. v ZTE (UK) Ltd. [2013]  EWHC  1591 (Pat): this case concerned a large portfolio 
owned by Vringo, many of which were SEPs, for which Vringo had offered ZTE a worldwide licence. 
Vringo argued at the English High Court that the FRAND issues should take priority in proceedings over 
validity and infringement, whereas ZTE argued for the opposite. Birss J stated that the court should be 
prepared to set a FRAND rate, but only where both parties were willing to be bound by the court’s 
determination, and that was not the case here. Birss J concluded that the court should not compel a 
defendant to be bound by a FRAND decision as this would cause the party to lose the right to challenge 
on validity and infringement. Thus, a FRAND trial should not be scheduled before 
invalidity/infringement issues have been dealt with. 
 
IPCom GmbH & Co Kg v HTC Europe Co Ltd & Ors [2015]  EWHC  1034 (Pat): here Floyd J at the High Court 
held the SEP (UMTS) valid as amended and infringed by certain Nokia products that are compliant to 
the UMTS  standard. On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld this decision. Yet, the EPO subsequently 
revoked the patent in opposition proceedings, leading to an appeal at the EPO Technical Board of 
Appeal. UK proceedings were suspended pending this appeal. Later, the High Court stated that it 
would not be appropriate to grant an injunction because IPCom was willing to grant a FRAND licence 
to Nokia (in line with its ETSI and European Commission commitments). Moreover, Nokia was willing 
to accept a licence on FRAND terms. Before the court could set FRAND terms, the parties came to a 
settlement.  
Unwired Planet v Huawei [2017] EWHC 711 (subsequently followed by Unwired Planet v Huawei [2017] 
EWHC 1304): in a series of judgments Birss J in the English High Court held that taking into account the 
CJEU’s guidance in Huawei v ZTE, it was possible to grant an injunction to the patent holder in an 
infringement case if FRAND terms were not accepted by the defendant. Unwired Planet had offered 
Huawei a world-wide licence on terms that Unwired Planet considered to be FRAND. Huawei rejected 
the world-wide licence, arguing that a lower-cost, UK-only licence would be FRAND. Birss J assessed 
whether the licensing offers were truly FRAND and considered a worldwide FRAND rate. Ultimately 
Birss J agreed with United Planet that the FRAND licence should be world-wide, not UK-specific, and 
evaluated a range of methods for determining the royalty rates of comparable world-wide licences to 
set what he considered to be FRAND rates in the circumstances of the case ([2017] EWHC 1304). He 
stated that ‘a FRAND royalty rate can be determined by making appropriate adjustments to a 
“benchmark rate” primarily based upon the SEP holder's portfolio’. Then, in the judgment that followed 
([2017 EWHC 1304]), after Huawei had refused the offer of the licence set at these terms, Unwired Planet 
sought a final injunction. Confirming that United Planet’s offer of a world-wide licence was FRAND, 
Birss J stated: 
 
“Since Unwired Planet have established that Huawei have infringed valid patents EP (UK) 2 229 744 and 
EP (UK) 1 230 818, and since Huawei have not been prepared to take a licence on the terms I have found 
to be FRAND, and since Unwired Planet are not in breach of competition law, a final injunction to 
restrain infringement of these two patents by Huawei should be granted.” 
 
Birss J. also explained that such a ‘FRAND injunction’ will be lifted once the defendant has agreed a 
FRAND licence. The operation of the FRAND injunction was suspended pending an ongoing appeal.  
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Therefore, it is clear that an important step forward for UK case law, and European law more generally, 
was provided by the HC decision in Unwired Planet v Huawei [2017] EWHC 711. The ruling clarifies the 
norm of global licensing in the context of FRAND, gave royalty setting guidance and showed a 
willingness to set a royalty rate, and confirmed the circumstances when granting an injunction is 
appropriate. This is a positive development, as standardisation of IoT (for example, 5G) is a global issue 
and this case represents the most comprehensive approach by a national court to intervene, positively, 
in ongoing negotiations that are at an impasse (Neven & Régibeau, 2017). Birss J’s ruling was recently 
upheld at the Court of Appeal of England & Wales, where it was emphasised that the High Court ruling 
complied with the principles laid down by CJEU in Huawei v ZTE (Unwired Planet v Huawei [2018] EWCA 
Civ 2344). 
 
Overall, the diversity of the circumstances in the above cases in Germany, The Netherlands, France and 
the UK gives weight to the Commission’s claim that the legal complexity involved in SEP/FRAND cases 
means that these types of disputes are ‘hard cases’ unsuited to a strict, inflexible approach. Instead, 
these disputes must be resolved on a case-by-case basis at the national level. 
2.2. Assessing the key issues and guiding principles highlighted by the EC 
communication of 29 November 2017 
 
Here, this report  analyses the key issues and assess the proposals highlighted by the Communication. 
The three key issues we identify are (i) transparency, (ii) valuation and (iii) enforcement.  
2.2.1. Transparency 
 
The first issue is the lack of transparency in the context of SEP licensing frameworks managed by SSOs. 
Accessing correct information on the scale of exposure to SEPs is extremely important to the users of 
standards, especially SMEs that have little experience of licensing practices and enter the relevant 
markets looking for connectivity – yet this information is not always easy to access. The Communication 
notes that ‘… currently the only  information on  SEPs  accessible  to  users  can  be  found  in  declaration  
databases  maintained  by  SSOs  which may  lack  transparency’ – a scenario that leaves companies, 
particularly SMEs and start-ups, in a difficult situation with respect to licensing negotiations and risk 
management. Moreover, simply relying on declarations made on the basis of self-assessment carried 
out by SEP holders is not sufficient; indeed, such declarations may be flawed as they are not scrutinised 
by independent entities. 
 
The recommendations proposed by the Communication to address the above issue are promising: the 
Commission (i) calls for greater cooperation between SSOs and patent offices; (ii) calls on SSOs to 
ensure that their databases  comply with the main quality features described above; (iii) calls on  SSOs 
to transform the current declaration  system into a tool providing more up-to-date and precise 
information on SEPs; (iv) considers that declared SEPs  should be subject to reliable scrutiny of their 
essentiality for a standard; and (v) will launch a pilot project for SEPs  in selected technologies with a 
view to facilitating the introduction of an appropriate scrutiny mechanism. The Commission further 
provides its commitment to co-operate with SSOs to facilitate this. 
 
Improving the quality and accessibility of SSOs databases for patent owners, users and third parties, for 
example by incorporating user-friendly interfaces, appears both laudable and achievable. Furthermore, 
providing links to patent office databases, including at the European Patent Office (EPO) and the 
national patent offices in all EU Member States, is crucial to highlight the visibility and exposure of SEPs 
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in various IoT sectors. Such patent databases are, in any event, publicly accessible, and can give 
precious information on: (i) the current owner of a patent (for example, as a consequence of a transfer 
of rights); (ii) the status of the patent, including claims that have been amended/reduced as a 
consequence of an opposition before the office (thus potentially clarifying the overall breadth of the 
SEP, and thus the implementer’s potential exposure). In this regard, formal, written agreements 
between SSOs and patent offices in Europe, facilitated by the institutions of the EU such as the 
Commission and European Parliament, should be secured to guarantee that the links to such important 
information are smoothly and efficiently managed. 
 
The Communication also suggests that patent owners and implementers should be encouraged to 
provide information on cases related to their SEPs (eg, docket number) and the outcome (eg 
infringement, damages, patent invalidity, reduction of claims, etc.). The fact that SEPs on key 
technologies are litigated more frequently than other patents means that information asymmetry 
between patent holders and implementers/users/competitors is a serious problem. The 
Communication proposes that SSOs should provide incentives for patent holders and technology users 
to report case references and final outcomes of litigation on declared SEPs (especially where rulings 
concern essentiality and patent validity). This is a reasonable approach. Furthermore, the 
Communication notes that this would not be a heavy burden on SEP-owners and technology users, as 
they already possess all information and documents related to these disputes (as party to the 
proceedings).  
 
Finally, the need for a higher degree of scrutiny on essentiality claims, stressed by the Communication, 
is crucially important. SEP-owners’ self-declarations that their technology is ‘standard’ is sub-optimal 
as an efficient mechanism. While the declaration process is important, to reassure the SSO and third 
parties that the SEP technology will be accessible and licensed under FRAND terms/conditions, the fact 
that the declarations are based on self-assessment by the patent owner, and are not scrutinised 
regarding essentiality, leaves open the possibility of mistake, and even deliberate over-broad claiming 
of a standard. As noted by the Communication, several studies on important technologies have 
revealed that, when strictly assessed, only between 10% and 50% of declared patent are really 
essential.5   
 
This uncertainty leaves new entrants to the IoT market in a weak and uncertain position. In licensing 
negotiations, the de facto presumption of essentiality gives the patent-holder an advantage and places 
a significant burden on the licensee to check essentiality. The Commission therefore seeks a more 
reliable system involving more scrutiny of essentiality declarations. The Commission’s proposal to 
subject the essentiality claims to a review by an independent entity with technical capabilities is 
sensible. The cost of such assessment should be equally split between the SEP-owner and the 
implementer, with a percentage of the overall cost being also borne by the relevant SSO.  
                                                 
5 See fn 21 of the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents, Brussels, 29.11.2017 COM(2017) 712.  
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/26583 
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2.2.2. Valuation 
 
Following the CJEU Huawei v ZTE case, the key issues concerning SEP licensing can be summarised as 
follows: (i) how should the royalty base be determined? Should it be determined by the smallest 
saleable practising unit or on an end-product basis? How could this effect SEP value?; (ii) how should 
the royalty rate be determined? Should it be a percentage of the end product or a flat rate (recalling 
that the English High Court decision of Unwired Planet v Huawei states that ‘a FRAND royalty rate can 
be determined by making appropriate adjustments to a “benchmark rate” primarily based upon the 
SEP holder's portfolio’); and (iii) how to determine the level of licensing in the value chain?  Should it 
be considered at end-company or at chipmaker level? How will this affect SEP value?  
 
In the Communication the Commission puts forward a balanced approach that provides guiding 
principles, rather than giving clear and specific prescriptive answers to each and every one of these 
questions. Thus, the Communication identifies relevant principles that should be used by SEP owners 
and implementers when it comes to negotiating FRAND licences, including the following: (i) assessing 
the economic value of the patented technology; (ii) maintaining good faith in negotiating procedures; 
(iii) the refusal of a ‘one-size-fits all’ proposal in favour of a case-by-case approach; and (iv) the need to 
avoid royalty-stacking (Lemley, 2007; Armstrong, Mueller & Syrett, 2014; Jones, 2014).6 
 
The first important valuation principle provided in the Communication is that the royalty to be paid by 
the implementer needs to bear a clear relationship to the economic value of the patented technology 
(that value focusing on the technology itself and not any aspect related to the decision to include the 
technology in the standard). From this statement we understand that the Commission considers that 
SEP royalties ought to be set on the basis of the value that the technology adds to the end product 
(rather than the on the ‘smallest saleable practising unit’ basis). The Commission does not outline 
specific royalty rates - to avoid a ‘one size fits all’ model - and instead leaves it to the parties to come to 
agreement in light of the above principle (and failing that, leaves it to be determined by national courts 
on a case-by-case basis). In addition, the Commission appears to approve of the approach of the English 
HC in Unwired Planet, stating that non-discrimination principle must be followed for ‘similarly situated’ 
implementers and licences can be global in scope.  
 
The Communication’s valuation principle is essentially based on an ex-ante approach. In other words, 
a reasonable royalty is the royalty that SEPs owners can obtain before the adoption of the standard, 
when they face competition, and not after the relevant choice is made, ie when there is a monopoly 
which allows the extraction of high royalties (Shapiro & Varian, 1999; Ohana, Hansen & Shah, 2003; 
Layne-Fararr, Llobet & Padilla, 2008). As has been remarked by MacCarthy (2009): 
 
“…the specificity and transparency of price information ex ante is pro-competitive. It allows the 
potential licensees in the SSO to understand the price they would pay for incorporating the technology 
into the standard and so allows competition on price as well as on technical merit in the standard 
setting deliberations. Moreover, it assures that the price is competitive as opposed to the 
supracompetitive price that potential licensees might face in the absence of clear price information ex 
ante.” 
                                                 
6 Royalty stacking scenarios occur where licensees need to pay royalties to multiple parties to be able to sell a product. This is the case of 
complex products that include many patent-protected standards, eg ICT products such as smart-phones incorporating a camera, a video, a 
web browser, wireless, text messages, etc. Thus, if even a few patent owners require standards implementers to pay royalties, such 
implementers, even the most efficient ones, may wish not to manufacture the product in question as it would be economically inconvenient 
to pay such high aggregate royalty amount. 
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 The level of royalty should be ‘crystallized’ ex ante and no increase could be made after a standard has 
been chosen. This is also in line with the Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal 
co-operation agreements,7 which provides criteria for determining whether a fee charged for access to 
an intellectual property right is unfair or unreasonable (para 289). Para 289 of the Guidelines 
recommends to compare the licensing fees charged by the IPR holder in a competitive scenario before 
the industry has been locked into the standard (ex ante) with those charged after the adoption of the 
standard (ex post).  
 
The second major principle identified on valuation relates to good faith negotiations over FRAND. At 
present, licensing is hampered by a lack of harmony in the interpretation of FRAND - and the 
subsequent litigation over FRAND licence terms risks delaying the uptake of new technologies, 
standardisation processes and the roll-out of IoT in Europe. Moreover, the CJEU’s view is that an 
'undertaking to grant licences on FRAND terms creates legitimate expectations on the part of third 
parties that the proprietor of the SEP will in fact grant licences on such terms' (Case C-170/13  Huawei 
Technologies, EU:C:2015:477, paragraph 53). On this, the Communication states: 
 
“Parties to a SEP licensing agreement, negotiating in good faith, are in the best position to determine 
the FRAND terms most appropriate to their specific situation. Efficiency considerations, reasonable 
licence fee expectations on both sides, the facilitation of the uptake by implementers to promote wide 
diffusion of the standard should be  taken  into account. It should  be  stressed  in  this  respect  that  
there  is  no  one-size-fits-all solution to what FRAND  is:  what  can  be  considered  fair  and  reasonable  
differs  from  sector  to  sector  and  over time. For this  reason, the Commission encourages stakeholders 
to pursue sectoral discussions with a view to establishing  common licensing  practices, based on the 
principles reflected in this Communication.”8 
 
Thus by emphasising the importance of good faith, the Communication gives appropriate weight to a 
legal principle that is crucial in the determination of such cases at the national level (as shown in 2.1 
above). This emphasis on good faith relates to the third major principle we identify on valuation: the 
avoidance of a ‘one size’ model in favour of a case-by-case approach. Ultimately, in the Commission’s 
view, licensing negotiations should be primarily left up to the parties in each case – ‘there is no one-
size-fits all solution to what FRAND is: what can be considered fair and reasonable differs from sector 
to sector and over time’. National courts therefore retain a crucial role, as noted in our evaluation of 
enforcement in 2.2.3 below. 
 
This report further notes that an alternative proposal would be to give SSOs the task to manage 
auctions between different technologies: patent owners that want their technology to be included as 
or in the standard could submit offers to SSOs to license their patent specifying a royalty. The 
implementer would then proceed to choose the most convenient offer (Swanson & Baumol, 2005; 
Farrell, Hayes, Shapiro & Sullivan, 2007). Such a system may offer a benchmark for what a FRAND royalty 
is, and would reflect the level of competition between patent owners and implementers that exists 
before the adoption of the standard. If the proposals on increasing transparency made in the 
Communication – linking more closely the SSOs with the EPO and national patent offices – are 
successful, SSOs may be better prepared to take on this task than they are today. 
 
In addition, there is a need to eliminate any discrimination amongst implementers, eg by relying on 
most-favoured licensee clauses (MFL) in licensing agreements, taking into account competition-related 
                                                 
7 Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements 
(Official Journal C 11 of 14.1.2011).  
8 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee setting 
out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents, Brussels, 29.11.2017 COM(2017) 712.  
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/26583 
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concerns. This clause would require SEP-owners to promptly notify a licensee of any licence, granted 
by them to a third party for the same patent under analogous circumstances, which gives rise to terms 
and conditions that are clearly more favourable than those granted to that licensee. This allows the 
latter to require SEP-owners the replacement of the terms and conditions of its licence with those of 
the third party (Brooks & Geradin, 2011; Van Bael & Bells, 2005). Such a clause aims thus at promising 
that no other licensee will obtain better terms and conditions (Lichtman, 2006).9 The inclusion of such 
clauses ought to be encouraged whenever appropriate. 
2.2.3. Enforcement 
 
The Communication states that a balanced and predictable enforcement regime can have positive 
effects on the overall negotiating processes between SEP-owners and implementers. Therefore, this is 
an area where the Commission believes a balance must be found between opposing interests. Indeed, 
while SEP-owners should be allowed to obtain legal relief, especially injunctions, against infringers who 
do not want to conclude a FRAND licence (so-called ‘patent hold-out’), the law should also protect the 
implementers of standardised technology that in good faith try to obtain such licence and are instead 
unjustifiably threatened with injunctions by SEP-owners (so-called ‘patent hold-up’). 
 
The behavioural criteria detailed by the CJEU in the seminal case of Huawei v ZTE are aimed in the right 
direction (for detailed analysis of this ruling, and its impact, see the prior sub-section 2.1). The ruling 
sets a procedural framework conducive to negotiations for balancing the interests of SEP-owners 
asking for an injunctive relief and alleged infringers. What is particularly laudable of Huawei v ZTE is that 
the CJEU highlighted the need for good faith in negotiations: injunctions should not be issued 
automatically without further consideration of the parties’ behaviour in the light of their relevant 
bargaining power (Pentheroudakis & Baron, 2017). The CJEU guidelines, read in conjunction with the 
Communication’s principles, provide ‘enough freedom to maneuver and steer future cases towards a 
far more objective approach’ (Gupta, Devaiah, Jain & Shrivastava, 2018). 
 
In terms of enforcement, alternatives to litigation are preferable. This report notes that alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms (including mediation and arbitration) could be promoted as swift and 
cost-effective ways to resolve disputes between SEPs holders and implementers, especially SMEs. 
Mediation and arbitration offer considerable cost benefits when compared with litigation, including (i) 
quicker and less expensive proceedings, (ii) a more informal and flexible dispute environment, (iii) 
confidentiality, (iv) more control on the proceedings, (v) enhanced and improved communication 
between the parties (Helmers and McDonagh, 2013).  
 
Arbitration proceedings may be particularly important to determine SEP related cases. Indeed, as a 
general remark, it is notable that arbitration is growing in importance worldwide as a means of 
resolving IP licensing disputes (Betancourt, 2016). Alternative dispute resolutions may also be 
embraced by the Unified Patent Court, if and when it becomes operational, as also noted by the 
Communication.10 Indeed, the UPC will feature highly specialised judges and likely offer a dedicated 
arbitration and mediation centre. It would therefore be recommendable to provide UPC arbitrators and 
mediators with (even more enhanced) training in the specific field of standard essential patents 
(McDonagh, 2016). 
                                                 
9 For an example of MFN clause see the DVD Patent Licence Agreement, which provides that “in the event that Licensor grants a DVD patent 
licence to another party with royalty rates more favorable” than those contained in the agreement, “Licensor shall send written notice to 
Licensee” and “Licensee” shall be entitled to an amendment to this Agreement to the extent of providing for royalty rates as favorable as 
those available to such other party”.  
10 See p. 12 of the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents, Brussels, 29.11.2017 COM(2017) 712. 
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/26583 
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2.3 Critical perspectives on the EC communication of 29 November 2017 
As described above in s.2.2-2.3, with the Communication the European Commission seeks to provide a 
balanced and non-binding policy document, which includes guidance for resolving questions the CJEU 
left open in Huawei v ZTE. For example, in the aftermath of the Huawei v ZTE case, it became clear that 
the CJEU had not actually specified how exactly the royalty rate should be calculated in order for it to 
be classed as FRAND. Jakob Dewispelaere states: 
  
“Consequently, despite CJEU guidance, patent holders and implementers still find themselves 
frequently embroiled in lawsuits, especially in SEP-heavy industries such as telecommunications, 
precisely because clear guidelines are lacking.” (Dewispeleare, 2017) 
 
Given these gaps, the Commission’s statement in the Communication has been described by several 
commentators as a ‘middle way’ or a ‘balanced’ approach aimed at providing appropriate guidance in 
the aftermath of Huawei. Such a policy document is necessary, and undoubtedly laudable; though it is 
notable that the text of the Communication does leave the Commission open to the criticism that the 
statement avoids answering the most difficult questions left unresolved by Huawei v ZTE. As a result, 
some commentators argue the Commission’s guidelines are not sufficiently clear. On this, 
Dewispeleare remarks that the Communication does not, in fact, provide clear answers to the 
fundamental questions that lead to SEP disputes, and drawn-out litigation, between patent holders 
and implementers: 
 
“What exactly is a fair royalty?  Who gets a license and who doesn’t? The Commission’s decision not to 
take sides does not mean that the problems will go away. Clarity on whether the royalty set by the SEP 
holder is un-FRAND or whether the SEP holder can be obliged to license its patent to all implementers 
rather than to end-users only will still need to come from courts and/or competition authorities.” 
(Dewispeleare, 2017) 
 
Similarly, Koch states: 
 
“However, the paper contained a disappointing lack of detail on some of the concepts of SEP licensing 
that often fall subject to dispute between SEP owners and prospective licensees.” (Koch, 2017) 
 
On one hand this is a valid criticism – the case-by-case nature of the approach endorsed by the 
Commission means that certain questions, such as the amount of a fair royalty, will inevitably still 
require litigation at the national level. On the other hand, if the Commission had given a strict, 
prescriptive view, the Communication would inevitably be criticised for tying the hands of the national 
courts and potentially doing injustice to patent holders.  
 
Indeed, the ‘middle-way’ approach taken by the Commission has the advantage of giving a limited set 
of guiding principles, while still allowing national courts to come to a fair determination in light of all 
the facts. Thus, the Communication’s approach provides ‘enough freedom to maneuver and steer 
future cases towards a far more objective approach’ (Gupta, Devaiah, Jain & Shrivastava, 2018). 
 
Moreover, although the Communication lacks clear guidance in some respects, it does provide useful, 
clarifying language in other areas. For instance, the Communication refers to ‘royalty stacking’ as an IP 
valuation principle that should be taken into account. Furthermore, the Commission states:  
 
“PAEs should be subject to the same rules as any other SEP holder, including after the transfer of SEPs 
from patent holders to PAEs.”   
 
Given the controversial nature of Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), and the wealth of literature criticising 
their ‘hold up’ actions and nuisance litigation behaviour in the ICT sector, this is a welcome statement 
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(Helmers, Love & McDonagh, 2014). Indeed, the importance of this point is underlined by a recently 
published empirical analysis that demonstrates that PAE litigation frequently involves SEPs (Contreras, 
Gaessler, Helmers & Love, 2018). The Commission clearly believes that FRAND commitments should be 
passed along with the ownership of the SEP in the event of the assignment/sale of the patent to a new 
owner, even if that owner is a PAE. In other words, regardless of the new owner’s willingness to license 
on FRAND terms, the Commission’s view is that the new owner (PAE) should be bound by prior FRAND 
commitments.  
 
Further criticism has come from the perspective of competition lawyers (Coates, Janutta & Kahmann, 
2018). Although the Communication focuses on SEP enforcement and FRAND licensing, it does not 
deal with the distinction between ‘use-based licensing’ and ‘licensing to all’. ‘Use-based licensing’ 
means that the fee or value of an SEP licence would vary depending on the end-use for which it is 
utilised, i.e. depending on whether it is used in a high-cost, high-value product such as an e-car, or 
whether it is used in a lower-cost, lower-value item such as an IoT consumer item, such as a web-
connected coffee machine or home heating device. By contrast, ‘licensing to all’ refers to a situation 
where any party would be entitled to an SEP licence, regardless of the value of the product the SEP 
technology will be used for. Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages, with the first 
generally viewed as more favourable to the SEP-owner, and the second more advantageous to the 
implementer/licensee.  
 
Indeed, two prior EC documents appear to show a preference for ‘licensing to all’:  
(i) the EC Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements state that a standards organisations’s 
intellectual property policy ought to envisage a clear commitment to offer essential IP 
rights, including patents, on FRAND terms (para 285); and  
(ii) the EC Decision against Motorola on infringement (referred to in 2.1 above) suggests that 
SEP holders who have made a FRAND commitment make SEPs available on FRAND 
terms/conditions to all implementers (para 294).  
 
Therefore, although the EC has not stated definitively in prior documents that failing to licence to all 
third parties on equivalent FRAND terms would be unlawful, the EC has nonetheless expressed a clear 
pro-competition preference. For this reason, it could be viewed as somewhat surprising that in the 
Communication the EC advocates for a balanced approach between the rights of competitors and SEP-
owners, noting that FRAND can ‘vary from sector to sector, and over time’. Nonetheless, this study 
agrees with the EC’s balanced approach, even if it means a mild revision of the EC’s prior pro-
competition approach. As seen in the UK case of Unwired Planet, national courts are often in the best 
position to consider what is FRAND in light of all the facts and circumstances (Neven & Régibeau, 2017). 
 
Although the Commission’s has been described as a balanced approach, it is worth weighing up more 
radical options. For example, some commentators suggest that SEPs should be licensed on a royalty-
free basis so to avoid disputes entirely (MacCarthy, 2009). In this view, SSOs could adopt the following 
approach: they could mandate royalty-free licensing as a requirement for participation to the work of 
the organization. This approach would aim to keep the access to the standardised technology as open 
as possible and thus reduce the costs of the products that incorporate that technology. In such a way, 
patent hold-up problems would be ruled out and the risks of patent related litigation minimized. 
However, royalty-free licensing approaches attract criticism from patent holders, as they effectively 
amount to compulsory licences.  
 
Indeed, a royalty-free licensing system would prevent investors from recouping the investments made 
to come up with the standardised technology - with the result that these investments would be 
discouraged. How could SEP-owners, the argument goes, be convinced to join a SSO if the latter 
requires them to give up any royalty in relation to the technology they have developed or are about to 
develop? Yet, it could be counter-argued that patent holders are not obliged to join SSOs. In this sense, 
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royalty-free licences would not be mandated - they would be voluntarily accepted as a condition of 
membership by private patent holders and users of technology that sought to become members of an 
SSO (MacCarthy, 2009). Ultimately, this radical approach would favour SEP-owners agreeing to forego 
some of their exclusive rights in exchange for the chance to have the technology included in a standard 
(MacCarthy, 2009). At present it is not part of the Commission’s proposal, but it can be evaluated in 
future EC proposals, perhaps in co-operation with SSOs, the EPO and national patent offices. 
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3. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECCOMANDATIONS 
Building on the findings presented in the previous chapters, this section presents the conclusions of 
the study on SEPs and a series of relevant policy recommendations. 
3.1 Conclusions  
The European Commission (EC) Communication of 29 November 2017 (“the Communication”) 
examines three important aspects of SEPs:11  
(i) the need to have a more transparent environment for negotiations between SEP-owners 
and licensees;  
(ii) the necessity of having common principles governing SEPs technologies;  
(iii) proposals for a more balanced enforcement system.  
 
This report finds that the conclusions reached by the Commission in the Communication are to a great 
extent reasonable and appropriate: 
• the CJEU approach and guidelines in Huawei v ZTE, as applied in the subsequent national cases 
such as Unwired Planet (UK), satisfy in an effective manner the interests of all stakeholders, ie SEPs 
owners, standard implementers, especially SMEs, and consumers; 
• the principles identified in the Communication with a view to guiding the valuation of SEPs 
and FRAND terms and managing enforcement are sound and viable, including the promotion of 
alternative dispute resolutions may offer cheaper and quicker ways to manage SEPs disputes, especially 
before the Unified Patent Court (once it is fully operational). 
 
Further schemes could be explored with a view to striking a balance between the interests of all 
stakeholders, including 
(i) encouraging SEPs holders to disclose - before the adoption of the standard - the most 
restrictive licensing terms, such as the maximum royalty rate; 
(ii) requiring undisclosed SEPs to be licensed on a royalty-free basis; 
(iii) organising and managing auctions with a view to choosing the most convenient technology;  
(iv) inserting most-favoured licensee clauses in licensing agreements; 
(v) adopting collective licensing and/or patent pools schemes;  
(vi) using open source platforms. 
 
Commenting on current problems and the need for a more stable and efficient regulatory 
environment, the Communication states: 
 
“Conflicting  interests  of  stakeholders  in  certain  SSOs  may  make  it  difficult  for  these organisations  
to  provide  effective  guidance  on  such  complex  legal  and  intellectual  property (IP)  policy  issues.  
Licensing  platform initiatives  in  this  area are  still  at  an  early  stage  and  have not  yet  been  adopted  
by  implementers,  who  may  well  be  hesitant  given  the  uncertainty  in  the current  SEP  regulatory  
environment  and  who  have  little  incentive  to  enter  into  a  deal  in  this context.”12 
 
This study concludes by emphasising that an improved environment cannot be achieved without 
communication, coordination and cooperation between the key stakeholders – the SSOs, the EPO, 
                                                 
11 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee setting 
out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents, Brussels, 29.11.2017 COM(2017) 712. 
12 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee setting 
out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents, Brussels, 29.11.2017 COM(2017) 712.  
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/26583 
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national patent offices, the EC, the European Parliament, and of course, SEP-owners and potential 
licensees. 
3.2. Policy recommendations  
On the basis of the above findings and conclusions, the study puts forward some policy 
recommendations. 
 
In particular, European Union institutions could explore the following in order to enhance the general 
environment of FRAND licensing in the context of SEPs: 
 
• enhancing the viability of collective licensing schemes, which would entail that participants to 
a SSO should be allowed to collectively negotiate royalty rates on behalf of standard implementers, so 
as to counterbalance the strong bargaining power held by SEP-owners. In some circumstances, this 
would require an emphasis on the fact that, as is long established in EU and national laws, an SEP-
owner’s property rights are not absolute. Moreover, this proposal should be assessed taking into 
account competition-related concerns, balanced with the rights of the SEP-owner. Indeed, collective 
licensing practices may be considered a violation of Article 101 TFEU, which prohibits restrictive 
agreements to the detriment of final consumers. Yet, it could also be argued that a collective licensing 
approach may actually benefit consumers and therefore could be exempted under Paragraph 3 of 
Article 101 TFEU. Indeed, collective negotiations would likely trigger competitive royalties, which could 
then be passed on end-consumers. 
  
• exploring the viability of licensing pools and other licensing platforms, including platforms that 
make use of advanced machine-learning (artificial intelligence), which may be particularly suitable for 
IoT industries, especially SMEs. Patent pools may be capable of ameliorating several SEP licensing 
problems, for example by offering one-stop-shop solutions and providing clarity on aggregate 
licensing fees (Aoki & Nagaoka, 2014). Via the one-stop-shop, patent pools have the potential to put 
patent owners in the position to offer a single joint licence for all the essential patents involved, with 
transactions costs being strongly reduced. Patent pool solutions could ensure sure that the aggregate 
royalty burden be such that the adoption of the standardised technology is still profitable to the user, 
despite the technology being protected by multiple patents. Generally, royalty rates in patent pool 
scenarios tend to be lower than rates extracted in bilateral contexts - this is because pool members can 
get other benefits from their being part of the pool, for example in terms of grant-backs. Yet, patent 
pools also may raise competition concerns as they may be considered as agreements which restrict 
trade; as such, they could potentially breach Article 101 TFEU. Nonetheless, patent pools have the 
potential of spurring innovation and benefit consumers by securing lower royalties (which would result 
in prices’ reduction for final customers) – for this reason they could potentially be exempted under 
Paragraph 3 of the above Article. 
 
• investigating the viability of ‘open source’ approaches in standardisation processes. As stressed 
in the Communication by the European Commission, synergies and effective interactions between 
standardisation and open source communities have the potential of promoting the uptake of 
advanced technology developments.13 However, it is necessary to acknowledge that open-source 
success stories, such as software, have succeeded via copyright law, rather than patent law; and in the 
                                                 
13 See p. 12 of the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents, Brussels, 29.11.2017 COM(2017) 712. 
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/26583 
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absence of a generally accepted system of open patenting, it may be insufficient as a solution. 
Nonetheless, although the open source and standardisation ecosystems have different traits (for 
example in terms of the prevalent type of IP protection), they also share common aspects, including 
collaborative open processes and contribution to innovation, and as such there is potential for open 
source software to underpin approaches to e.g. declaration of standards and provision of info on SEPs 
that can aid transparency (as noted in 2.2). 
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